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Polarising politics: the land question
Capturing the imagination of an Indian constitutional lawyer is not 
always easy. All too often, the every-day-questions of constitutional 
law revolve around rather technical issues like taxation, competition, 
or government contracts. And yet, there are some legal subjects which 
do certainly not belong to this dry routine of legal practice. One of 
them is the area of property and land law. The so called "land 
question", as this area is often called in India, is a fascinating legal 
subject for several reasons. Politically, the question over distribution 
and redistribution of land has been a game changer in several Indian 
state elections and catapulted parties which had been in powers for 






























governance is discussed as one of the most important hindrances to 
economic development as foreign and domestic investors complain 
about the hurdles of acquiring land. Culturally, land is deeply 
embedded in the identity of communities like the Adivasis and other 
rural communities. And, finally, legally, the area of land laws has been 
subject of spectacular confrontations between the Indian legislative on 
the one side and the Supreme Court on the other. The land question 
unfolded a surprising polarisation among all these lines—and it is safe 
to say that it remains one of the most delicate issues in Indian politics.  
The reasons for this polarisation are manifold and will be further 
explored in the remainder of this book review. 
However, to get a first understanding of India’s land question, three 
important factors shall be briefly highlighted already at this point: 
Firstly, India’s land markets are among the most fragmented land 
markets worldwide. This fragmentation into many small holdings 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to acquire large parcels of land. 
Especially for big public infrastructure projects, but also for private 
undertakings, the degree of fragmentation can represent a serious 
hurdle for realising a project. Secondly, especially in the last two 
decades, the land question turned increasingly into a question of 
identity. Unlike in other legal cultures like Europe for instance, Land is 
not perceived merely as a legal title or an economic good that has a 
monetary value but as a fundamental part of the own identity (Gupta 
2012). This nexus of land and identity has fuelled many protests 
against land acquisition, in many cases even in a violent manner. 
Finally, especially in the decade the question over land has become 
virulent as with the enactment of the Special Economic Zone Act 
(SEZA) a new and controversial regulatory model entered the stage of 
economic politics. Special Economic Zones (SEZ) spread rapidly all 
over the country—and went along with big and controversial land 
acquisitions. Quickly, the questions over the desirability of SEZ was 
transformed into a question if a political party is "anti-poor" or "anti-
farmer"—two topoi which can lead to quick polarisations of the political 
camps in India. 
 
The legal dimension of the land question 
As if this political and economic context is not challenging enough, the 
whole picture becomes more complex and turns truly into a puzzle if 
we consider the legal dimension of the land question. Being a large 
democratic federation, the legal framework of India’s land is divided 






























schedule of the Indian constitution provides that the power to regulate 
land vests with the states. This means that each state can pass the 
legal framework it deems to fit best for the structure and ownership of 
land within its own territory. This power, however, ends when it comes 
to the forceful expropriation of land owners which the constitution 
ascribes to the Union level. Until recently, the central legal document 
in this area has been the so-called Land Acquisition Act (LAA), an act 
which has been passed under British rule in 1894 and is regarded by 
many as an example par excellence for the brutal character of colonial 
bureaucracy.  
Yet, despite those colonial roots, the LAA has been in power for 
nearly 120 years and shaped the land governance of India after inde-
pendence for the biggest part of its history. It was only in 2013 that 
the act has been replaced with a new land act, called the Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act (LARRA). The new LARRA marks a significant 
shift from the old regime of the LAA: For instance, landowners, who 
have been forcefully displaced, receive much higher compensation, are 
entitled to rehabilitation and resettlement, and have a stronger 
position in terms of consent requirements.1 The replacement of the 
LAA after decades of struggle by various NGOs, farmers, and political 
movements has not only been a small sensation in India’s recent 
political history but has also been an occasion for academics to look 
back at the long history of the LAA and to critically evaluate the new 
legal framework of the LARRA.  
This book review introduces into three recent monographies on this 
topic and contextualizes them in the overall discussion surrounding 
land, development, and social justice in India. All three books shed 
light on the question of land governance, but do so from different 
disciplinary angels. The Price of Land: Acquisition, Conflict, Con-
sequence by Sanjoy Chakravorty discusses the Indian system of land 
governance from an economic point of view and argues that land 
markets in India have underwent some fundamental transformations. 
One the one hand, land prices have exploded in an unprecedented 
way. On the other hand, resistance and opposition have become more 
successful due to the spread of new information technologies. The 
second book, Land und Industrialisierung in Indien by Stefan Diederich 
looks at the topic from the perspective of political science and asks 
how it is to explain that the LAA has been in force for such a long time. 






























Acquisition Law by Jairam Ramesh and Muhammad Ali Khan introduces 
into the details of the new LARRA from the drafter’s point of view.  
In a nutshell: what is the land question? 
So, what does it mean when we speak of the land question or land 
conflicts in India? Like in other parts of the world, the Indian economy, 
too, is witnessing an exploding demand for land (D'Costa & Chakra-
borty 2017). No matter if public infrastructure like highways, power 
plants, and dams or private projects like factories, SEZ, and hotels: all 
of them need land as a prerequisite. Land, however, is a scarce 
resource—and not everybody is willing to sell his or her parcel of land 
for the realisation of such a project. Put simply, this is the point where 
the state steps in: after a suitable area for a public or private project 
has been identified, the landowners (in most cases: peasants) receive 
a notification that the government authorities want to acquire their 
parcels of land. After some time to file objections, the state ultimately 
takes possession of the land and compensates the landloosers. This 
power of the state to forcefully acquire land is called "eminent 
domain." Conflict can occur at different stages of this process. Some 
landowners do not want to sell their land at all, no matter what the 
price is. But more often, the matter of dispute is the compensation 
level which in many cases is perceived as too low by the landowners.  
In India, the eminent domain power of the state has led to intensive 
debates about the necessity, depth, and scope of this legal instrument 
(Downing 2013). The arguments surrounding the eminent domain 
power can be divided into two legal key questions: Firstly, in what 
cases is the state allowed to make use of this power? Secondly, once 
an expropriation has been undertaken, what kind of compensation 
should the landloosers receive? The first question is usually discussed 
under the label of "public purpose": only when the acquisition serves a 
public purpose the state can make use of his eminent domain power. 
Yet, what might sound plausible at first glance, turns out to be a tricky 
legal question: what exactly is a public purpose? Can private projects 
like the construction of a factory, which will provide hundreds of jobs, 
also be a public purpose? And how important do the public interests 
must be to justify an expropriation? Interestingly, these questions 
mark an area, where liberal and left-wing voices give similar answers. 
Liberals argue that land transactions should be undertaken solely by 
free markets. Corporations which want to acquire land should 






























This can be a long and complex endeavour, but this is how markets 
work—and individual property rights should be valid in every situation. 
Left-leaning voices argue that the state can of course restrict individual 
property rights, but in the case of land the acquisitions mostly serve a 
neoliberal model of development.  
This conflict between individual property rights on the one hand and 
the power of the state to expropriate on the other hand has been a 
frequent theme in Indian legal history (Sankaranarayanan 2011). 
Compared to other legal systems, the Indian approach to eminent 
domain was marked by an extraordinary powerful position of the state. 
The enactment of the new land law in 2013, however, marks a signi-
ficant legal shift in this legal area—and all three books under discus-
sion circle around that rupture.  
The giving and the taking state: Chakravorty’s intervention 
If one would have to sum up Chakravorty’s book in a nutshell, one 
could say that Chakravorty’s primary aim is to ground the heated 
debates on land in empirical evidence. This empirical exercise is 
necessary because policy makers have '(…) either little knowledge of 
or little interest in the land market or in market principles'  
(Chakravorty 2013: 181). Chakravorty paints an alarming and dark 
picture of the political landscape: political parties have either no 
coherent positions on land governance or act out of sheer self-interest. 
Developing an effective legal framework, however, requires knowledge 
as a precondition. Chakravorty’s book tries to provide this knowledge 
in three parts. The first part ("The Present") gives an account of pres-
ent land conflicts. The second part ("The Past") looks back to the long 
history of distribution and redistribution of land in India, while the third 
part ("The Future") evaluates the structural conditions of India’s land 
market and discusses the new legal framework of the LARRA. 
The first part of Chakravorty’s book is an extremely useful 
introduction into the complex field of land conflicts by pointing to some 
similarities of these conflicts all over India. An interesting finding of 
Chakravorty, for instance, is that the typical land conflict does not take 
place between peasants and private industry, but that the overall 
number of conflicts (around 90 per cent) revolve around public pro-
jects. This is somewhat contrary to the popular perception of land 
conflicts as a phenomenon of capitalist accumulation by dispossession 
(cf. Levien 2013). On the other side, Chakravorty, too, shows that with 






























has become more and more important. But not only the actors of land 
conflicts are similar, also the reasons for resistance against land 
acquisition can be grouped and systemised along different categories: 
in many cases, resistance occurs because the landowners did not get 
enough time to face objections or engage in negotiations. These are 
the cases where the public authorities have used the so called 
"emergency" or "urgency" clauses of the LAA to forcefully acquire the 
land. In other cases, landowners argue that there is less productive 
land (so called wasteland) which should be acquired instead or that the 
area of land to be acquired is bigger than the area needed for the 
project. In terms of the involved agents, Chakravorty shows that the 
sheer number of interests affected by an acquisition provides another 
reason for the complex structure of these conflicts. 
On the side of the buyers there is little surprise as we find public or 
private entities. The other side, however, cannot be reduced to the 
sellers of land, hence the landowners. A group which is at least equally 
important to understand India’s land conflicts are stakeholders who do 
not own land. Tenant farmers or wage laborers, for example, produce 
or work on land without owning it. Likewise, groups like Adivasis use 
land as community resources without having individual property titles. 
The most significant actor, however, is the civil society which has 
organised opposition on the ground and collected information on 
acquisition projects all over India. Chakravorty takes the reader in a 
very clear and well-structured manner through many details of land 
conflicts and finishes the first part by pointing to some "flashpoints" of 
land conflicts. 
Whereas the first part of Chakravorty’s book remains largely de-
scriptive, the second part delves in a rich and compelling manner into 
the economic and political history of land governance. Chakravorty 
unfolds this story along the figure of the "giving" and the "taking" 
Indian state after independence and shows how the state engaged in 
re-distributive land policies on the one hand (the giving state), but has 
also displaced millions of people in the name of the modern, develop-
mental state (the taking state). Especially in independent India, this 
regime of distribution and redistribution of land played an important 
economic and political role. Yet, this mechanism of land governance is 
older than the modern, developmental state. Chakravorty shows that 
the origins of this regime date back to the time of company raj in 
India. Most importantly, the very idea of individual land titles and 
private property has been introduced as one of 'the Company’s 






























permanent settlement in the east, the zamindars were no longer 
regarded as merely revenue collectors for the company but as 
proprietors of the land. Interestingly, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 
is only mentioned briefly at the end of the chapter on company and 
state raj. Somewhat contrary to the popular expression that the LAA is 
a colonial law, Chakravorty argues that the LAA played only a marginal 
role during colonialism and has not affected any large numbers of 
people. To unfold the power of the LAA, another actor had to step in: 
the postcolonial developmental state.  
In contrast to the colonial state, the postcolonial state was driven by 
a vision to transform the state at large-scale level. At the level of land-
reforms, the removal of zamindaris is surely the most well-known 
reform of the young independent state. But also, other, less known 
land reforms like tenancy reform or limits on the size of land holdings 
played an important role in the state’s vison of a just and social trans-
formation of land distribution. While this aspect of India’s early days 
after independence might be known to many, the chapter becomes 
interesting when it comes to one of Chakravorty’s original aims: the 
empirical grounding of land policies. Chakravorty shows that only few 
of the socialist slogans and big visions of redistribution had any effect 
in practice. Whereas zamindari abolition indeed led to more equality, 
other reforms had no significant impact on the unequal structures of 
the land market. What had an impact on the daily lives of millions, 
however, has been the other face of the Indian state: the taking state. 
For decades, the most important tool of the taking state has been the 
already mentioned LAA which gives the state the power to forcefully 
acquire land for a public purpose. The requirement that the acquisition 
must be done for a public purpose was used in a broad and extensive 
way. Moreover, provisions on consultations of project affected people 
were circumvented by relying on emergency clause.   
For the newly independent Indian state it was essential to have at 
hand some readymade legislation on land acquisition because the 
state needed to begin a massive industrialization and moderni-
zation project for which large quantities of land were required. 
Nothing close to it had been undertaken in British India. In fact, it 
is doubtful whether jump-start industrialization on this scale, in 
such a short period, had ever been attempted anywhere else 
(with the possible exception of the Soviet Union). (ibd.: 114) 
Under the circumstances of rapid industrialisation, millions had been 
displaced with the help of the LAA and in the name of development. 






























not acquire the numbers; but Chakravorty estimates that between 50 
and 60 million people had been affected by land acquisition.  
This story of displacement in the name of development continued 
through the history of independent India. But at the beginning of the 
21st century a new player entered the scene who fundamentally 
changed the policy area of land acquisition: the Special Economic 
Zone. SEZs are demarcated spaces for private investors in which a 
different regulatory environment is in force than in the rest of the 
country. After the UPA government passed the so called SEZ Act in 
2005, hundreds of SEZ had been notified all over the country. Yet, 
running a SEZ is not possible without land. And to acquire the needed 
land, government authorities made—once again—use of the LAA. The 
crucial difference to "conventional" land conflicts, however, is that in 
the case of SEZ the beneficiaries are private investors. The 
development discourse thus shifted into a direction where "public 
purpose", as required by the LAA, is understood in way that private 
investors are included by the notion of public interests. The perhaps 
most important effect of this shift was that the country-wide expansion 
of SEZ led to wide and bitter opposition (Jenkins 2014) and made land 
acquisition a top priority political topic. 
In sum, Chakravorty’s second part paints a bleak picture of the 
history of land conflicts in India. The big promise of a more equal and 
just society has failed to become reality as at most 5,9 per cent of 
agricultural land had changed hands and 50-60 million people were 
displaced. But how did this harsh regime of the LAA survive for such a 
long period of time? Chakravorty explanation is a numerical one: The 
"winners" of this regime have outnumbered the "losers." If, for 
instance, a community is displaced to build an electricity plant, then 
the numbers of beneficiaries are far higher than the number of 
displaced people. And what counts at the end of the day are electoral 
majorities.  
So, what about the way forward? The future of Indian land 
governance is still unclear. But it is safe to say that the land regime is 
undergoing a historic transition. Chakravorty begins his last part with 
some more empirical insights into the price of land. Based on the 
Residential Price Index (RESIDEX) Chakravorty shows that land prices 
in urban settings have increased by a factor of five in one decade. 
Likewise, agricultural land prices have risen drastically due to the 
growth of income and the expansion of credit supply. One of the most 






























prices for the highest end of housing in India with some international 
counterparts: 
In Hong Kong, London, Tokyo, and Paris, four highly developed 
and very congested megacities with among the highest land 
prices in the world, between 62 and 69 years of the national 
average income is needed to buy housing in the highest end of 
the property market. In New York City and Singapore, around 47 
years of the national per capita income is needed to purchase 
housing in the most desirable neighborhoods. In Mumbai the 
comparable number is 580 years, far and away the largest 
number in the dataset. (Chakravorty 2013: 147) 
Chakravorty concludes his book with a brief evaluation of the new legal 
framework of LARRA.2 Chakravorty has not doubt that the new land 
law marks a radical departure from the LAA-regime by expanding 
consent and compensation requirements. Yet, he remains critical: 
whereas the old law under-compensated the landloosers, the new law 
clearly overcompensates them. Under the new requirements of LARRA, 
land acquisition becomes so expansive that the consequences for the 
Indian society might be "miserable." Every vision of development, 
even social democratic or progressive ones, depends on the ability of 
the state to expropriate—and invoking the eminent domain power 
might become impossible under the new requirements of LARRA. 
In sum, Chakravorty’s book is of high value to every researcher who 
wants to read a concise and well written introduction into the field of 
land conflicts in India. The strength of the book is without doubt its 
empirical foundation. Where others engage in ideological battles, 
Chakravorty speaks the language of numbers and datasets. Yet, 
Chakravorty’s empirical exercise is far from being apolitical. Being an 
economist, Chakravorty’s analysis is driven by a trust in market forces 
and dedicated to a development model which builds on growth and 
free markets. This might explain why the author’s critique of LARRA is 
formulated is such a harsh way. The reader, however, should be aware 
that this harsh critique of LARRA is grounded in a very specific idea of 
development and does not necessarily mean that LARRA is a "bad" law 
which only serves political self-interests.  
The power of institutions: Diederich’s history of the LAA 
Whoever is interested in the political and institutional history of land 
governance in India should read Stefan Diederich’s Land und Indus-






























language and thus misses the opportunity to reach a wider audience. 
Diederich’s aim is to explain why the LAA has been in force for such a 
long time and what led to the sudden replacement of the LAA with the 
LARRA. Indeed, the question is well justified: how can a law which 
clearly bears the signature of the colonial administration survive for 
decades in a democratic federation like India? To answer this question, 
Diederich looks at the LAA through the lens of historic institutionalism. 
The basic assumption behind this theory is that it is not enough to 
think of institutions as something shaped by individuals, but that we 
must look at this relationship also the other way around: it is also 
institutions which shape individual behaviour. The basic tool kit of 
Diederich’s work is theories of (institutional) path dependence, 
increasing returns, and of critical junctures. Understanding these 
theories might be difficult for those who are not familiar to insti-
tutionalist theories. However, Diederich is aware of this problem and 
uses the introduction to introduce in a (too) detailed manner into these 
schools of thought. Diederich’s basic assumption might be summarised 
as follows: once the administrative machinery of the LAA had been 
created by the British administration, political actors in colonial and 
independent India had little incentive to abolish this regime and to 
replace it with something else. This so called institutional lock-in could 
only be overcome after the formation of different political advocacy 
coalitions which worked against the LAA and in favor of a new law.  
After explaining the basic assumptions and justifications of eminent 
domain, Diederich engages in a historical exercise, which is similar to 
Chakravorty’s part on history, but much more detailed. Diederich, too, 
recapitulates how individual land titles and the eminent domain power 
have been invented by the colonial administration and shows that the 
LAA served the purpose of a rapid expansion of the colonial state. 
Moreover, to carry out the expansion in a cost-effective way, the 
compensation requirements of the LAA were kept as low as possible. A 
strategy to justify these legal interventions has been to contrast a 
seemingly "despotic" organisation of land rights with a "civilised", 
modern, and western notion of individual land titles. But not only the 
LAA fundamentally transformed land governance during colonialism. 
Also in other areas of land law, like forest governance, local social 
structures were destroyed by declaring forests "waste land" which 
belongs to the state and can be used without even invoking the 
eminent domain power (Diederich 2015: 132). 
Most parts on property and land rights during colonialism will be 
known to readers who are familiar with Indian legal history. The 
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chapter becomes interesting, however, when it comes to the initial 
years of Indian independence. Diederich shows that for a short period 
of time the approach towards property rights and expropriation 
remained open—and that different institutional developments would 
have been possible. The work of the constitutional assembly could 
have been the right moment for a rupture with the British system of 
eminent domain. Yet, the system of the LAA remained not only in 
force, but unfolded a power which even exceeded its application under 
British Rule. Diederich claims that, like in other areas of law, there has 
been a strong incentive to incorporate the colonial land laws because 
the (mostly British educated) ruling elite was "used" to them and the 
accompanying legal practice. Likewise, the administrative service had 
little interest in changing a well-known legal practice. Conflicts within 
the elite on the depth and scope of the right to property (think only 
about the famous clashes between Nehru and Patel) were delegated to 
the courts. The subsequent confrontation between the legislative and 
the judiciary ended with the removal of the fundamental right to 
property with the 44th amendment—and the instrument of eminent 
domain got more powerful than it has ever been before. 
Why and how did this acquisition regime change? This question 
stands at the center of Diederich’s fourth chapter which argues that for 
a long time the area of land acquisition has not been perceived as a 
distinct policy field, but that land acquisition took place below the radar 
of big politics. This, however, changed in the 1980s. The most 
important context for the beginning policy change is surely the begin 
of India’s economic liberalisation in the late 1980s which led to an 
increasing demand of land. Simultaneously, the group of people 
affected by land acquisition becomes more visible through an 
increasing collaboration between NGOs, the media, and, at least 
partly, the judiciary. A crucial difference to preceding protests has 
been that NGOs began to translate the language of local peasant 
protests into the professional language of politics in Delhi. Likewise, 
academics and think tanks began to look at the issue of forceful 
displacements. 
Slowly but steady, the many but isolated conflicts on land 
acquisition transformed into a distinct policy subsystem in which 
different advocacy coalitions acted either in favour or against the land 
acquisition system of the LAA. This emergence of an advocacy 
coalition, however, was not sufficient, of course, to change the LAA. 
According to Diederich something else was needed: a political shock. 






























land acquisition in West Bengal. After demonstrations against a SEZ in 
the small village of Nandigram left 14 people dead and protests 
erupted against a large acquisition project in Singur, the issue of land 
led to an end of the decade long reign of the communist party in West 
Bengal. Suddenly, the question of land acquisition unfolded a political 
power which could become dangerous to ruling political parties. 
Likewise, the powerful National Alliance of People's Movements (NAPM) 
had managed to become a direct negotiating partner of the UPA-II 
government. The political conditions thus became ideal to change the 
LAA—and indeed, with the enactment of LARRA in 2013 a 120 year old 
institution came to an end.  
In sum, Diederich’s book provides an interesting account for every-
body interested in the political history of land acquisition in India. But 
also on a more general level, the book is a valuable contribution to the 
question of legislative change in India by showing how social questions 
can enter high level politics. The role attributed to the judiciary, 
however, is surprisingly small. This is astonishing since in many areas 
of politics in India, the courts (most notably: the Supreme Court) play 
an important role when it comes to legislative change and are an 
important part of institutional dynamics.3 Here, it could have been 
interesting to ask why the courts are perhaps more reluctant to 
intervene in the area of land acquisition than in other areas.  
The power of law: Ramesh’s and Ali-Khan’s view from within 
Whoever might miss the legal dimension in Diederich’s book is well 
advised to look into Legislating for justice: the making of the 2013 
Land Acquisition Law by Jairam Ramesh and Muhammad Ali Khan. 
Ramesh, a Congress politician, has been Union Minister for Rural 
Development and is currently a member of the Rajya Sabha. Ali Khan 
is an advocate at the Supreme Court and was an officer on Special 
Duty to Jairam Ramesh.  
To begin with, it should be stressed that the book by Ramesh and 
Ali Khan is not an academic contribution to the field but a very 
practical insight into the world of law making. Most parts of the book 
are dedicated to explaining the many different provisions of the new 
land law by comparing LARRA to the LAA. Ramesh and Ali Khan leave 
little doubt that they consider the new land law a big achievement. And 
indeed, reading the author’s explanations of the different provisions of 
the new act leaves one with the impression that LARRA can be 
considered a milestone in Indian legislative history.  
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Ramesh and Ali Khan begin their book with a brief assessment of 
the policy area of land acquisition and highlight that an important 
factor for the enactment of the new land law has been the "rights 
based approach" of the UPA government. During that time, different 
legislative milestones had been achieved like the Right to Education 
Act, the Right to Information Act, or the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act. The following chapters explain the different provisions 
of the act along the chronological order of land acquisition proceed-
ings. Beginning with the requirement of a social impact assessment 
(SIA) before every land acquisition, the authors explain how the 
reasoning behind every provision took place. In the case of SIA, for 
instance, the drafting committee organised a group discussion process 
with officers who worked on land acquisition and different actors of 
civil society. 
Ramesh and Ali Khan show how with the help of such discussions, 
expert hearings, and different expert studies the final provision on SIA 
has been drafted. The outcome is a provision which requires social 
impact assessments in all cases of land acquisition. The new LARRA 
requires that an independent expert group must evaluate in every case 
if a public purpose is served and if the benefits of the acquisition 
outweigh the social costs. Ramesh and Ali Khan explain how the LARRA 
addressed every controversial provision of the old LAA and replaced 
those old provisions with the new system of LARRA.  
It would go beyond the scope of a book review to summarize every 
legal provision explained by Ramesh and Ali Khan. For this reason, two 
brief and more general observations shall conclude this part of the 
review: firstly, Ramesh’s and Ali Khan’s book somewhat refutes 
Chakravorty’s depiction of an uninformed and amateurish policy sphere 
in land acquisition.  Quite in the contrary, the authors give an insight 
into how serious the drafting committee took the task of reforming the 
land acquisition system. The reader does not get the impression that 
the negative points raised by Chakravorty (like the amount of 
compensation) have been drafted in an amateurish and self-interested 
manner but that they are the result of a thoughtful and conscious 
process. Indeed, the fact that Chakravorty frontally attacks some 
provisions of LARRA, while the very same provisions are presented as 
a big success by Ramesh and Ali Khan demonstrates how radical 
economic and political views sometimes differ on the very same issues. 
What appears economically sound might simultaneously be at odds 




Secondly, readers should be aware that Ramesh’s and Ali Khan’s 
book is a biased book in the sense that next to explaining the LARRA 
the author’s primary goal is obviously to advertise "their" achievement 
and to defend it against criticism. Though the authors mention critical 
objections against LARRA at various points, one does not get the 
impression that these objections were taken serious enough. For 
instance, the social impact assessment by the expert group can still be 
overruled by the government in case the expert group recommends 
refraining from conducting the acquisition. Ramesh and Ali Khan, 
however, stress that only 'very reckless officials would proceed against 
an "Expert" report' (Ramesh & Khan 2015: 23) and that the critique of 
this provision therefore is unjustified. But given the fact that political 
majorities change and that the prevalent political idea in India is not a 
right based agenda anymore it is far from impossible that such 
"reckless" decisions will be made in the future. 
Land governance as a battle of ideas 
This book review introduced into three different accounts on land 
reforms in India. Though looking at the field from three different dis-
ciplinary angles, all books have one thing in common—they exemplify 
that land governance is not only a complex legal field, but primarily a 
field in which different ideas and ideals of development clash. Like a 
prism, the history of land governance in India makes us look at many 
concurring ideas which constantly thrive for hegemony: ideas of 
economic liberalisation and a "business friendly" environment concur 
with visions of social transformation and distribution; communal 
models of shared resources concur with "modern" systems of 
individual property rights; union-wide development agendas concur 
with states having their own economic and political ideas. The future of 
India’s land governance will depend on many actors, but three actors 
will play a particularly important role: firstly, the BJP has stressed on 
many occasion that it wants to reverse many of the achievements of 
LARRA. Currently, the BJP lacks a majority in the second chamber of 
the Indian parliament, the Rajya Sabha. 
This current status quo, however, can change easily as the BJP has 
managed to replicate its union wide success in many states. Secondly, 
much will depend on the judiciary. Beginning in 2015, various state 
governments began to amend the LARRA at state level—and it is an 
open legal question if this approach is constitutional. Finally, and most 
importantly, it will depend on the civil society to uphold the recent 
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achievements in land governance. If the land question has been a 
game changer in state elections once, this can easily be the case in 
future elections. 
Endnotes 
1 Wahi, Namita et al. (eds.). 2017. Land acquisition in India: a review of the Supreme Court Cases 
1950-2016. edited by Centre for Policy Research New Delhi, p. 16,  
http://www.lawtransform.no/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Land-Acquisition-Report.pdf 
[retrieved 08.11.2017]. 
2 It should be noted that at the time when Chakravorty wrote his book the law was not enacted. 
However, the draft discussed by the author did not change substantially. 
3 Cf. fn. 1 
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